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THE REASONABLENESS OF FAITH AS A RESPONSE TO EVIL
INTRODUCTION
There is currently more discussion of the arguments 
for and against the existence of God than there has been at 
any time since the heyday of Logical Positivism. Examples
of this are recent books on the cosmological argument by
1 2 William Craig and William Rowe, Alvin Plantinga's defense
of the ontological argument,^ and books by Basil Mitchell^ 
and Richard Swinburne^ on what Mitchell calls "the cumulative 
case" for theism.
The result of this renewal of interest has been some 
important contributions to the literature on arguments for 
the existence of God. This renewal of interest in natural 
theology has, however, produced what I would argue are less 
than impressive results in dealing with the problem of evil.
A glaring example is the work of James Ross on the two is­
sues. His version of the ontological argument is ingenious. 
His response to the problem of evil (Shakespeare has no obli­
gation to make Hamlet happy, so by analogy, God has no obli­
gation to make us happy) is grotesque.^
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I propose to take an approach different from other 
contemporary writers on these topics. This different ap­
proach involves dividing the questions of God's goodness and 
God's existence, and treating the former as a matter of a 
faith, and the latter as a matter for reason alone. (In di­
viding the question of God's goodness and his existence, I 
cannot, of course, include goodness as part of the definition 
of "God.") One immediate advantage of dividing the questions 
is to dispel what I think is a widespread illusion concerning 
the probability of God's existence. I think that there is a 
stronger case for God's existence than there is for God's be­
ing good. If I am correct, then the claim that there is a 
God is more probable than the claim that God is good. If we 
fail to divide the questions, then we let lack of evidence 
for God's goodness appear to lessen the probability of God's 
existence.
My main interest in this work is with the problem of 
evil, but in the development of my argument, I find it neces­
sary to discuss the topic of arguments for God's existence as 
well. This is because of the role that I assign faith. That 
role does not involve God's existence. Instead, faith is 
evoked in support of what William James calls "the religious 
hypothesis." The religious hypothesis is the belief that our 
lives can make a permanent contribution to a valued larger 
whole, in spite of the apparently transitory nature of all 
human accomplishments.
The religious hypothesis is, because of its generality, 
a more reasonable object of faith than the specific tenets of 
theistic religion. The religious hypothesis is in this regard 
like belief in life on other planets, theism like belief in 
maroon-colored humanoids on Mars. In the absence of arguments 
for either proposition, the former is more probable, simply 
because its generality means that more than one state of af­
fairs would make it true. The defense of theism that I offer 
concludes that God is good through a combination of the reli­
gious hypothesis and arguments for God's existence.
In the first chapter of this work, I discuss the two 
versions of the atheologican's argument from evil, and I ex­
plain why I think that only one version deserves serious at­
tention. In the second chapter, I discuss William James's 
defense of faith in the religious hypothesis. If one can 
provide reasons for thinking that God exists, then it would 
be reasonable to state the more general religious hypothesis 
in the more specific form of a claim that God is good. I 
therefore turn aside from my main theme in the third chapter 
to indicate why I think that reason may lead one to belief in 
God. In the remainder of the work, I return to more tradi­
tional topics surrounding the problem of evil.
In the course of this work, I employ as my definition 
of God "a cause for the existence of all beings other than 
himself, who is in some respects analogous to a person." It 
is this concept of God whose existence is supported by the
reasons that I offer in the third chapter.
This God-concept is a minimal one, common to many- 
different versions of theism. For this reason, I use 'the­
ism' for any view that includes the claim that a being meet­
ing my minimal definition exists, and I refer to anyone who 
believes that such a being exists as a theist.
INTRODUCTION NOTES
^William Lane Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argu­
ment (New York: Barnes § Noble, 1970}.
William Rowe, The Cosmological Argument (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975).
^See Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (London; 
George Allen § Unwin, 1975), pp. 85-111.
^Basil Mitchell, The Justification of Religious Be­
lief (New York". The Seabury Press, 1973)1
^Richard Swinburne, The Existence o£ God (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 102-106
CHAPTER ONE 
THE INCONSISTENCY ARGUMENT
For the religious believer, the evil in this world 
is a source of inner tension. The state of mind of one who 
attempts to give more than lip-service to the creeds of the 
Western monotheistic religions is described by John Hick as 
follows :
To the believer "The heavens declare the glory of God, 
and the firmament showeth his handiwork"; in the endless 
beauty of the earth he sees the smile [as it were) of 
the earth's Creator; in his neighbors he discovers fel­
low children of the heavenly Father; in the imperatives 
of morality he feels the pressure upon him of the abso­
lute demands of God; in life's joy and happiness he dis­
cerns the bountiful goodness of the Lord, and in its 
frustrations and disappointments he sees, even if only 
in retrospect, God's austere but gracious discipline sav­
ing him from too complete involvement in purely earthly 
hopes and purposes. In both joy and sorrow, success and 
failure, rejoicing and mourning, he sees, however fit­
fully and faintly, the hand of God holding him within the 
orbit of the on-going divine purpose, whose fulfillment 
can alone secure his own final fulfillment and blessed­
ness. Thus the believer's daily life is of a piece with 
his inner life of prayer, when he speaks to God in direct 
communication. . . . All of life is for him a dialogue 
with the divine Thou ; in and through all his dealings 
with life he is having to do with God and God with him.-*-
It is difficult to always see life as "a dialogue
with the divine Thou," when that life includes seemingly
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pointless sickness, pain, and death. In addition to the many
natural evils, from 'cancer to earthquakes, which men are prey
to there is a vast multitude of evils that men inflict upon
one another. Dostoevski, in an often-quoted passage from The
Brothers Karamazov, gives a powerful summary of some of the
horrors that occur in this world where the believer attempts
to discern the hand of God. In this passage, Ivan tells of
the crimes committed by Turks in Bulgaria:
They burn villages, murder, outrage women and children, 
they nail their prisoners by their ears to the fences, 
leave them so till morning, and in the morning they hang 
them--all sorts of things you can’t imagine. . . . These 
Turks took a pleasure in torturing children too; cutting 
the unborn child from the mother's womb, and tossing ba­
bies up in the air and catching them on the points of 
their bayonets before their mother's eyes. Doing it be­
fore the mother's eyes was what gave zest to the amuse­
ment. Here is another scene that I thought very inter­
esting. Imagine a trembling mother with her baby in her 
arms, a circle of invading Turks around her. They've 
planned a diversion; they pet the baby, laugh to make it 
laugh. They succeed, the baby laughs. At that moment a 
Turk points a pistol four inches from the baby's face.
The baby laughs with glee, holds out his little hands to 
the pistol, and he pulls the trigger in the baby's face 
and blows out its brains. Artistic, wasn't it?^
We can imagine a better world--a world without the violence, 
the starvation, the illness. If God is good, then he must be 
as appalled as we are by the state of the world. Being God, 
he is supposedly powerful enough to alter things which we 
would alter, had we the power. Why does he not do so? No 
one can seriously attempt to live a life of trust in God with­
out agonizing over why God permits the evils we encounter in 
this world.
That the believer's agonized questioning produces no
satisfactory answer is not enough to show anything concern­
ing the reasonableness of his beliefs. In order to get an 
argument against faith out of the mystery of evil it is nec­
essary to provide some sort of argument that it is either 
impossible or improbable that God has a good reason for 
creating the world in which we find ourselves. Some philos­
ophers, such as J. L. Mackie, have thought it logically im­
possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for his 
permission of evil. Their argument, which I shall refer to 
as the inconsistency argument, has received a great deal of 
attention in the literature on the problem of evil. I think, 
however, that the inconsistency argument is no serious threat 
to belief.^
The inconsistency argument involves the claim that 
there is a contradiction between the various items of theis­
tic belief. The set of beliefs that are supposedly contra­
dictory are the following:
1. God is omnipotent.
2. God is wholly good.
3. Evil exists.
There is no obvious contradiction here, as there 
would be if the theist believed both that God allows no evil 
and that evil exists. To derive a contradiction from 1-3 
additional premises must be added. Since what is asserted 
is a contradiction between the items of religious belief, 
any additional premises must be either necessary truths or
items of religious tradition in question.
J. L. Mackie suggests that the missing premises are 
logical truths concerning what it is to be omnipotent and 
what it is to be wholly good. The additional premises he 
offers are:
4. A good being eliminates all evil that he can elimi­
nate .
5. There are no limits on what an omnipotent being can 
do.
From 4 and 5 Mackie derives:
6. A good omnipotent being eliminates all evil.
From 6, in conjunction with 1 and 2 (which tell us 
that there is a being who is good and omnipotent) we con­
clude:
7. There is no evil.
Premise 7 is the contradiction of premise 3. Since 
1-6 have yielded a contradiction, at least one of these 
premises must go. Mackie suggests that the most reasonable 
candidates for elimination are either 1 or 2, both of which 
are essential to theism.^
The proper reply to this is that the premises the 
theist will eliminate are 4 and 5. Neither one is (as Mackie 
claims) an essential part of theism, and neither one is true.
There are obviously many evils which a good being 
will not eliminate. The dentist is not less good for inflict­
ing the pain involved in dental surgery. The parent is not 
less good for letting his child learn by painful experience.
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that running too fast will result in a fall. Premise 4 is
not a necessary truth: it is, in fact, not a truth.
Keith Yandell has drawn up a list of some conditions
under which a good being is excused from eliminating evil:
1. The prevention of E (an evil) will also prevent some 
good, G, which is of equal value to the non-existence of 
E and for which E is the logically necessary condition.
2. The prevention of E will entail the existence of E’, 
which is as evil as E.
3. The prevention of E will also prevent some good G 
which is of greater value that the non-existence of E 
and for which E is a logically necessary condition.
4. The prevention of E will entail the existence of E' 
which is a greater evil than E and for which the non­
existence of E is a logically sufficient condition.5
There would be a contradiction in the Hebrew- 
Christian tradition only if it were an essential part of 
that tradition, or a logically necessary truth, that neither 
these excusing conditions, nor any others of which we may be 
unaware, are applicable to,God.
Premise 5 is a definition of omnipotence that most 
theists would reject. To say that God is omnipotent is not 
to say that there are no limits on what God can do. Most 
theists would say that God could not make a round square.
To say this is not to say that God lacks some power, which 
another being might have had. God cannot do a contradictory 
task, not because he lacks the power, but because a contradic­
tory formula fails to specify a real task to be accomplished.
The only premises that the atheologian can add to 
1-3 which come near to what he wants to say are that a good
11
being eliminates all evils he can eliminate and is morally 
obligated to eliminate, and God can do whatever an omnipo­
tent being can do. From these premises no contradiction 
can be derived.
I know no premises which will fare better in produc­
ing a contradiction between the members of 1-3 than those 
Mackie suggests. The atheologian is so convinced that 1-3 
cannot all be true that he thinks outright logical contra­
diction must lurk somewhere in these premises. However, it 
does not. Insistence that it does makes the task of theism's 
philosophical defenders far easier than it otherwise would 
be. Time spent showing how wrong-headed the inconsistency 
argument is is time which might otherwise have had to be 
spent wrestling with the claim that evil makes God's being
good improbable. It is the probability argument I shall
henceforth address.
The probability argument has the form used in discon- 
firming a scientific hypothesis. Given our theory (God is 
good) we expect certain consequences (the existence of a cer­
tain sort of world). Looking around, we see a different sort 
of world from that which, prima facia, we would expect from a 
good God. This does not prove that God is not good, but it
does tend to make it less probable, and so, in the absence of
strong independent grounds for affirming that God is good, 
the reasonable thing to do is to assume that either there is 
no God, or else God is not good. The case is similar to that
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of a scientist whose theory concerning the formation of the 
planets seems to lend itself to the expectation that certain 
gases would be in the atmosphere of all the planets. What 
evidence there is indicates that these gases do not exist in 
the atmosphere of Mars. This does not make the planet- 
formation theory in question necessarily false. However, it 
does tend to disconfirm it.
The astronomer in question might respond to the ap­
parently disconfirming evidence in several ways. He might 
present independent evidence for the correctness of his the­
ory to counter-balance the contrary evidence. He might of­
fer reasons to think that even were the gases present in the 
Martian atmosphere, we would be unable to detect them. Or 
he might argue that facts previously overlooked make the 
lack of gases in the Martian atmosphere compatible with his 
theory after all.
The case I shall make in replying to the probability 
argument from evil employs tactics analogous to each of 
these moves on the part of the astronomer. I shall offer 
evidence that God is good to counter-balance to some degree 
the evidence on the other side. I shall argue that there 
are grounds for doubting our ability to anticipate the sort 
of world that a good omnipotent God would create. I shall 
argue that one sort of evil, moral evil, does in fact fit 
the expectation we might have concerning a world created by 
a good God.
However, before I make any of these arguments I 
shall first explore a crucial disanalogy between the case of 
the astronomer discussed above and the case of the apologist 
for Western monotheism. The astronomer has no business ac­
cepting a theory unless he can show it to be more probable 
than rival theories. Meeting objections to it based on the 
absence of the Martian gases is only part of his job. By 
analogy, one might think that the theist must show that the 
existence of a good omnipotent creator is, given the world 
as we find it, more probable than any alternative view. How­
ever, this is not so: I shall argue that because of the na­
ture of religious faith the apologist has accomplished all 
he needs to accomplish if he can make a case that God's be­
ing good is not overwhelmingly improbable.
CHAPTER ONE NOTES
^John Hick, Faith and Knowledge (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1957), pp. 189-190.
2
Fydor Dostoevski, The Brothers Karamazov, quoted in
Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (London: George
Allen § Unwin, 1975), p . 31
^See Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, pp. 12-
14.
^J. L. Mackie, "Evil and Omnipotence," Mind 64 
(April 1955): 200-201.
^Keith Yandell, Basic Issues in the Philosophy of 
Religion (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1981), p. 47.
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CHAPTER TWO 
FAITH
I have read somewhere of Scottish juries returning 
verdicts of "not proven" instead of declaring an accused 
party to be proven innocent or proven guilty. The theist, 
in order to defend the reasonableness of his religious com­
mitment need not secure an "innocent" verdict in God's trial 
before his human accusers. A verdict of "not proven" is 
sufficient. That this is so is due to the nature of faith.
The concept of faith that I shall defend is inspired by the 
writings of William James. It may or may not be a view 
James would endorse. It is a view suggested by some pas­
sages in his writings. My discussion is organized around 
those passages, but I am less concerned with whether the 
view is that of James than I am with its correctness.
In "The Will to Believe," as well as in several re­
lated essays, James offers a defense of our right to adopt a 
believing attitude towards a certain class of unproven prop­
ositions. James is particularly concerned to assert this
right with regard to what he calls "the religious hypothesis."
15
16
James characterizes the religious hypothesis as the claim
that "the best things are the more eternal things." A phrase
that James quotes as summarizing the religious hypothesis is
. . perfection is eternal.'"^ In "Is Life Worth Living?"
James adds to this characterization as follows:
A man's religious faith (whatever more special items of 
doctrine it may involve) means for me essentially his 
faith in the existence of an unseen order of some kind 
in which the riddles of the natural order may be found 
explained. In the more developed religions the natural 
world has always been regarded as the mere scaffolding 
or vestibule of a truer, more eternal world, and affirmed 
to be a sphere of education, trial, and redemption.^
The essential religious claim, according to James, is this: 
human life is part of a larger drama which is, on the whole, 
at least potentially good. (A good world history may, in 
part, be conditional upon our own actions--hence the quali­
fication "potentially.") James is not, then, concerned to 
defend our right to hold any particular version of religious 
belief. The details of doctrine will have to be justified 
without reference to James. James's defense of faith is a 
defense of our right to believe that our lives can perma­
nently contribute to a valued larger whole, even though ap­
pearances (the evil in the world) admittedly suggest that on 
the contrary, life is absurd, all victories of good are 
fleeting, and the end of the universal drama is inevitably 
tragic.
In claiming that we have a right to believe in the 
religious hypothesis, nowhere, to my knowledge, does James 
define the word 'believe'. If by 'believe', James means
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'thinking a proposition is probable or certain’, then there 
is no right to believe what we do not think is probable or 
certain. It is immoral to strive to convince oneself that a 
proposition is more probable than (deep down) one knows it 
is. I doubt that James is advocating self-deception in 
claiming that we have a right to believe the religious hy­
pothesis .
I do not believe that James would define belief as
thinking something probable. Instead I think that he would
define belief as a psychological state characterized by a
tendency to perform certain actions. In "The Sentiment of
Rationality," James writes:
. . .  as the test of belief is willingness to act, one 
may say that faith is the readiness to act in a cause 
the prosperous issue of which is not certified to us in
advance. It is in fact the same moral quality which we
call courage in practical affairs.3
As an example of what this sort of faith amounts to, con­
sider the following sort of case:
A husband finds evidence that his wife has had an 
affair. The husband, however, seizes upon the real possi­
bility that nevertheless his wife is innocent. He hopes 
with all his heart that she is innocent. He knows that if
he continues to let himself entertain doubts about his wife,
he will be unable to keep those doubts from affecting his 
conduct towards her: he will be reserved and suspicious.
For him to continue to dwell on the possibility of her guilt 
may result in just as much pain for him as if he knew her
18
guilt to be a certainty--and all, perhaps, for nothing. 
Therefore, he decides to focus his thoughts on the positive 
possibility that his wife is innocent.
In the sense that I think James uses the word "be­
lieve,” this man believes his wife to be innocent. The 
man's state certainly resembles what we ordinarily judge to 
be belief: he bases his thoughts and actions on an assump­
tion of his wife’s innocence. In doing so, however, he is 
conscious that his decision to assume her innocence involves 
his taking a risk. No self-deception is involved in this 
faith, but courage is involved, and that precisely because 
the believer does not deceive himself about the state of the 
evidence.
The right to believe is a right that James thinks we
have whenever certain conditions are met. In "The Will to
Believe," James summarizes his thesis as follows:
Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must de­
cide an option between propositions, whenever it is a 
genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on 
intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circum­
stances, 'Do not decide, but leave the question open' is 
itself a passional decision--just like deciding yes or 
no--and is attended with, the same risk of losing the 
truth.4
This summary is couched in a terminology which requires some 
explanation. An option, for James, is a decision between 
two beliefs. A genuine option is an option that is forced, 
living, and momentous. To say that an option is "forced" is 
to say that one view or the other must be taken. To say that 
an option is "living" is to say that both are possible for
1 Q
U S .  Finally, "momentous” is defined by contrast; an option 
is not momentous "when the opportunity is not unique, when 
the stake is insignificant, or when the decision is reversi­
ble if it later proves unwise."^
James gets into trouble when he becomes more specific 
about what it is for an option to be forced. He states that 
a forced option is a dilemma based on a complete logical dis­
junction. It is, however, a trivial truth that any belief 
may be put in for X in the formula "accept X or do not," 
thereby making it a part of a forced option. The dilemma 
"accept X or do not" is based on a complete logical disjunc­
tion. There is no standing place outside the alternatives-- 
the very mark, James at one point says, of the forced op­
tion.^ If this is what a forced option amounts to, then on 
this score any and all beliefs would be candidates for an 
exercise of faith. The condition would rule out nothing.
I suggest that James would have been better off if 
he had characterized forced options in a different manner. 
Some of his comments about agnosticism suggest another, and 
more defensible, concept of forced options.
Initially there would appear to be three possibil­
ities with regard to any belief: acceptance, denial, and
agnosticism. But James insists that with regard to reli­
gious belief the last is not a real possibility:
We cannot escape the issue by remaining sceptical and 
waiting for more light, because, although we do avoid 
error in that way if religion be untrue, we lose the
20
good, if ^  true, just as certainly as if we posi­
tively chose to disbelieve.^
This ruling out of agnosticism seems to have its
justification in the momentous character of that which will
be gained or lost through believing or failing to believe:
Whenever the option between losing truth and gaining it 
is not momentous, we can throw the chance of gaining 
truth away, and at any rate save ourselves from any 
chance of believing falsehood by not making up our minds 
at all till objective evidence has come.®
These remarks suggest that what is forced is not, as 
James says, the option between two beliefs, but rather gain­
ing or losing the benefits of belief. One may lose the bene­
fits of belief either by unbelief or by agnosticism, but if 
religion be true one loses in both cases. This religious 
case is like that of a man debating whether to propose mar­
riage. If he hesitates forever to propose, he loses her just 
as much as if he decided not to marry her. Indecision and a 
decision against have the same results.
What are the benefits involved in the religious hy­
pothesis? In answering this question, I shall ignore the 
answer James gives in "The Will to Believe," where he does 
his case great harm by using the language of Pascal's Wager 
and by talk of "getting in on the winning side." In "Is 
Life Worth Living?" James forgoes the pleasures of shocking 
people and gives a more sober answer. Speaking of those at­
tracted by the religious hypothesis, but painfully aware of 
the evils of this world, James writes:
21
The bars assurance that this natural order is not ulti­
mate but a mere sign or vision, the external staging of 
a many-storied universe, in which spiritual forces have 
the last word and are eternal--the bare assurance is to 
such men enough to make life seem worth living in spite 
of every contrary presumption suggested by its circum­
stances on the natural plane. Destroy this inner assur­
ance, however vague as it is, and all the light and ra­
diance of existence is extinguished for these persons 
at a stroke.9
The blacker the atheologian paints the universe, the 
stronger the pragmatic case he makes for faith. The more he 
preaches on the manifest evils of the world, the more it be­
gins to look like the alternative to despair, doubt, and what 
James calls "the nightmare view of life"^^ is faith in the 
religious hypothesis.
This will, of course, not convince the complacent 
atheist, or agnostic, whose state of mind may depend on more 
immediate, less cosmic, considerations. But the question 
that I am interested in is not whether everyone ought to have 
faith in the religious hypothesis, but whether it is wrong 
for anyone to have faith. The religious hypothesis confronts 
some people with a forced option: gain, or fail to gain es­
cape from the shadow of demoralizing pessimism. No option 
could be more momentous, affecting as it does how one shall 
live his life and whether he shall have hope. If we cannot 
decide for or against the religious hypothesis on intellec­
tual grounds, then the religious hypothesis may (for some 
people) meet the conditions for a proposition to be a proper 
object of faith.
In "The Will to Believe," James says little about his
22
judgment that the truth or falsity of the religious hypothe­
sis cannot be decided on intellectual grounds. But in "Is 
Life Worth Living?" James writes ". . .we are free to trust 
at our own risk anything that is not impossible, and that 
can bring analogies to bear in its b e h a l f . H e  uses the 
religious hypothesis as an example of the sort of proposi­
tion that he has in mind. In behalf of the religious hypo­
thesis, we can offer the following sort of analogy, which 
suggests the possibility that there may be a purpose behind 
events of which we have no idea:
Our dogs . . . are in our human life but not of it.
They witness hourly the outward body of events whose 
inner meaning cannot, by any possible operation, be re­
vealed to their intelligence--events in which they them­
selves often play tke cardinal part. My terrier bites 
a teasing boy, for example, and the father demands dam­
ages. The dog may be present at every step of the nego­
tiations, and see the money paid, without an inkling of 
what it all means, without a suspicion that it has any­
thing to do with him; and he never can know in his na­
tural dog's life.12
By means of such analogies, James thinks that the 
religious hypothesis, which certainly cannot be proven true, 
can be shown to be a real possibility that we cannot rule 
out.
The passage from the writings of James that I have 
so far discussed suggest the following analysis of our right
to faith: S has a right to have faith in p if:
(1) S desires that p be the case.
(2j P's being true is a real (not merely a logical pos­
sibility.
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(3) S has the choice of acting as he would if he knew p 
was true, and gaining important benefits, or of acting 
as he would if he knew p was false, thereby failing to 
gain those benefits.
(4) No more evidence than S now has concerning the truth
of p can be expected to come to light.
The first and second conditions I list together cor­
respond to James's insistence that the object of faith must 
be a "live" hypothesis. The third condition combines the 
ideas that the option must be forced and momentous. The 
fourth condition corresponds to James's condition that the 
option must be one that "cannot by its nature be decided on 
intellectual grounds."
Where these conditions are met, there can be no ob­
jection that it is not reasonable to have faith. Under the 
circumstances specified, any choice one makes will be a
choice dictated by one's "passional nature." When confronted
with the religious hypothesis, we can let our hopes be the 
guide of our thoughts and actions, or we can let despair 
play that role, or we can let our fear of erring by either 
path keep us alternating between one mood or the other. (I 
speak only of those for whom the option in question is mo­
mentous. It is only for such people that faith may be ra­
tional . )
The last-named response has nothing to commend it 
where there can be no question of adopting it as a temporary 
stance until more and better evidence is obtained. Where no 
better evidence will be forthcoming, the decision to make no
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decision is only another decision dictated by emotion.
According to James, there are two rules that we may
apply to our intellectual life. These two rules are "Shun
error," and "Know truth." One who makes "Know truth" his
motto will, when confronted with an option of the sort in
question make a choice for one side or the other. One who
gives first place to the rule "Shun error," will refuse to
make a decision, even though realizing the momentous, forced
character of the option. Which rule one makes paramount is
a matter of one's "passional decision." Speaking of W. K.
Clifford, James says:
Believe nothing, he tells us, keep your mind in suspense 
forever, rather than by closing it on insufficient evi­
dence incur the awful risk of believing lies. You, on 
the other hand, may think that the risk of being in er­
ror is a very small matter when compared with the bless­
ings of real knowledge, and be ready to be duped many 
times . . . rather than postpone indefinitely your 
chance of guessing true. I myself find it impossible to 
go with Clifford. We must remember that these feelings 
of duty about either truth or error are in any case only 
expressions of our passional life . . .  he who says, 
"Better go without belief forever than believe a lie!" 
merely shows his own preponderant private horror of be­
coming a dupe. . . .
It is like a general informing his soldiers that it 
is better to keep out of battle forever than to risk a
single wound.13
Suppose one decides to choose: shall it be a choice
dictated by one's hopes or by one's fears? James does not 
deny that one may choose to follow one's fears, but he con­
cludes "The Will to Believe" with a quote from Fitz James 
Stephens exhorting us to decide for hope: ". . . In all im­
portant transactions of life we have to take a leap in the
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dark. . . .  Be strong and of a good courage. Act for the
best, hope for the best, and take what comes........If death
ends all, we cannot meet death better.
The importance of the religious hypothesis for the 
problem of evil is that in conjunction with the belief that 
God exists, it can lead us to faith that God is good. If 
God exists, then his being good explains how the religious 
hypothesis can be true. A world with a good God in it is a 
world with a power in it that may be sufficient to bring good 
out of what seems to be pointless tragedy. It is a world 
where all defeats of good can, at worst, be no more than par­
tial. On the other hand, if God exists, but is not good, 
then it is very difficult to see how the religious hypothesis 
could be true.
Given the obvious difficulty of combining faith in 
the religious hypothesis and belief in a God who is not good, 
the theist will ask himself, "Is God good?" not "Is the re­
ligious hypothesis true or false?" For the theist, the ques­
tion of whether God is good may take on the same characteris­
tics that makes it reasonable to have faith in the religious 
hypothesis. The same hopes and fears that surround the reli­
gious hypothesis will surround the question of God's goodness. 
The same benefits will be involved in a positive faith-answer. 
The same conditions will apply in deciding whether we have a 
right to our faith. Of these conditions, the one that is 
crucial is that the option cannot be decided on intellectual
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grounds. If it is reasonable to think that there is a God, 
and not overwhelmingly improbable that he is good, then the 
right to faith that James defends applies (for the theist) 
to belief that God is good.
CHAPTER TWO NOTES
^William James, "The Will to Believe," in The Will
to Believe (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1956), p .
25 (hereafter referred to as "WB").
^William James, "Is Life Worth Living?" in The Will 
to Believe (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1956), pp.
51-52 (hereafter referred to as "ILWL").
William James, "The Sentiment of Rationality," in 
The Will to Believe (New York: Dover Publications, Inc.,
i) , p. 90.
^"WB," p. 11.
^"WB,” p. 4.
^"WB," p. 3.
"^IVB," p. 26.
^"WB," pp. 19-20.
^"ILWL," pp. 56-57.
^^"ILWL," p. 39.
^^"ILWL," p. 57.
^^"ILWL," p. 58.
^^"WB," p. 18.
^"^"WB," p. 31.
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CHAPTER THREE 
ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
If there are good reasons for thinking that God ex­
ists, then there are good reasons for stating the more gen­
eral religious hypothesis in theistic terms, as faith in the 
goodness of God. Can a case be made for the existence of 
God?
Giving evidence for the existence of God was once a 
common philosophical occupation. The standard for a success­
ful proof which philosophers attempted to meet was to produce 
arguments employing as premises obvious facts and necessary 
truths and having as their conclusions that God exists. That 
such an enterprise would not succeed is probable on a priori 
grounds. Highly controversial truths are only rarely deduced 
from a combination of the obvious with necessary truths.
That an argument for God's existence meeting such 
stringent requirements is unlikely to be found is further 
evidenced by a study of those arguments for the existence of 
God which have received the most intense philosophical scru­
tiny. The three arguments which, judging by the attention
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they have received, are the most impressive of the tradition­
al arguments, are the ontological, cosmological, and teleo- 
logical arguments.
The ontological argument is an attempt to deduce the 
existence of God (defined by the ontological arguer as a log­
ically necessary being) from the logical possibility of his 
existence. The problem with the argument is the difficulty 
of justifying the claim that God's existence is logically 
possible. Defenders of the argument tend to confuse episte- 
mic possibility (what is possible for all w  may know) with 
logical possibility. But that a logically necessary being is 
an epistemic possibility is no indication that one is logical 
possibility. The non-existence of everything also is an epi­
stemic possibility. However, if a logically necessary being 
is possible (and therefore exists) then the non-existence of 
everything must be a logical impossibility. It is impossible 
that a logically necessary being is existing and nothing at 
all existing both be logically possible states of affairs-- 
but both are equally epistemic possibilities. No ontological 
arguer I know of has provided good reasons to single out the 
former, rather than the latter, as the only one logically pos­
sible. I might as well argue that either it is mathematically 
impossible for 62 x 7 to equal 424 or else 62 x 7 does equal 
424; it is not impossible for all 2 know (I haven't done the 
multiplication) and therefore 62 x 7 = 424.
By the cosmological argument I mean the argument which
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proceeds from the existence of the world to the existence of 
God via the Principle of Sufficient Reason. (A number of ar­
guments, whose common feature is sometimes hard to discern, 
are sometimes referred to as versions of the cosmological ar­
gument.) The argument in question claims that every state of 
affairs must have an explanation (a sufficient reason). The 
totality of what exists cannot (by definition) be explained 
in terms of something external to it. It can be explained in 
terms of something internal to it only if one or all its con- 
stitutents are logically necessary. Therefore something is 
logically necessary. The universe is not logically necessary. 
Therefore, that something is other than the universe, i.e., 
God. Whatever other objections the argument is open to, it 
is open to the objection of a fatal dependence on the logical 
possibility of a logically necessary being. We expect things 
in general to have an explanation, but the expectation would 
not apply to something whose having an explanation is a log­
ical impossibility. An explanation for the totality of what 
exists would be logically impossible unless a logically nec­
essary being is a logical possibility. To induce us to ex­
pect an explanation for the totality of what exists, the cos­
mological arguer would first have to do what ontological ar- 
guers have failed to do, that is, show the logical possibility 
of a logically necessary being.
The teleological argument is the argument which pro­
ceeds from the orderliness of the universe to the existence of
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God as universe-designer. The problem with the argument is 
that teleological arguers do not show that order in the uni­
verse requires explanation. One may answer the question "Why 
is there so much order in the universe?" by the reply "That's 
just the way things are." The theist whose God is not a log­
ically necessary being must answer the question "Why is there 
a God?" with the reply "That's just the way things are."
There is no automatic theoretical advantage in explaining or­
der by means of a God whose existence is "just the way things 
are" when one could simply say of the order itself that it is 
"just the way things are."
A priori, the attempt to find arguments for the exis­
tence of God employing only necessary or obvious truths is 
unlikely to succeed. In fact, we find that the most impres­
sive attempts to do so fail. Widespread realization of the 
failure of the arguments has been accompanied by a rejection 
of the need for arguments by theologians, and by an assump­
tion on the part of many unbelievers that there is no possi­
bility of rational support for religious belief. "You can't 
argue for the existence of God" was, until recently, almost 
proverbial.
A less extreme reaction would be to question the stan­
dard that a successful argument for the existence of God has 
been expected to meet. Why expect the theist to provide a 
stronger case than proponents of other philosophical posi­
tions are expected to provide?
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Basil Mitchell, in his book The Justification of Re­
ligious Belief, explores the logic of the type of debate 
that most commonly occurs in philosophy. Mitchell quotes 
with approval the characterization of philosophical discus­
sion offered by F. Waismann in "How I see Philosophy”:
Arguments are used in such a discussion, not as proofs, 
though, but rather as means to make him see things he 
had not noticed before: e.g. to dispel wrong analogies,
to stress similarities with other cases and in this way 
to bring about something like a shift in perspective. 
However, there is no way of proving him wrong or bully­
ing him into mental acceptance of the pronosal: when
all is said and done the decision is his.^
To this characterization of philosophical debate, 
Mitchell adds two other points. First, he suggests that 
philosophical arguments often have the form of cumulative 
cases: a series of items, each of which provides some
slight support for a position, when taken together may make 
a convincing case. An argument having the form of this sort 
of cumulative case is one in which, as John Wisdom said "The 
process of argument is not a chain of demonstrative reason­
ing. It is a presenting and representing of those features
of the case which severally co-operate in favor of the 
2
case."
A second point that Mitchell makes is that arguments 
in philosophy very often depend for their persuasiveness on 
securing an agreement that a position has an advantage over 
others in such respects as simplicity and explanatory power. 
Mitchell adds that we must, if we would escape relativism, 
acknowledge a human capacity for judgment that does not
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consist in following deductive or inductive rules, but con­
sists rather in the highly controversial but rational pro­
cess of judging world-views according to such "values" as 
consistency, coherence, simplicity, and explanatory power.
Naturalists hold the views that they do because they 
believe it provides them with a comparatively simple theory 
by which they can account for a wide range of facts. Why 
should stronger sorts of reasons be required for being a the­
ist than the naturalist has for being a naturalist?
I, of course, think that the theist need only provide 
similar sorts of arguments for the belief that God exists. 
Furthermore, I think that such arguments can be provided. To 
support this last claim, however, without departing too far 
from my announced subject, poses a problem.
It would be inadequate for me to do no more at this 
point than assert that a case of the sort Mitchell discusses 
can be made for theism. On the other hand, my subject is the 
problem of evil, not the making of a case for the existence 
of God. To fully construct such a case would require a work 
of equal or greater length than this one. I shall therefore 
limit my effort to providing some evidence that a cumulative 
case for God's existence can be constructed. I will provide 
such evidence by sketching two arguments which might be a 
part of such a case. Presentation of these arguments is in­
tended to show that it is at least reasonable to think that 
God exists. If it is reasonable to think that God exists,
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then it is reasonable to state the religious hypothesis in 
terras of God's being good. Since the problem of evil, which 
is ray real concern, is a challenge to the reasonableness of 
faith that God is good, it is the reasonableness, not the 
truth, of the claim that God exists that is ray concern.
Before I present the arguments that I wish to dis­
cuss, I need to say more concerning what I mean to assert 
when I claim that there is a God. By the claim that there 
is a God, I mean to assert that there exists a non-erabodied 
person who makes or permits the existence of all things other 
than himself. This is, of course, not the only possible God- 
concept, but only the one that I choose to defend and employ.
God, on this conception, is a terminus of explana­
tion. God's choices are not to be explained, save in terms 
of other choices of his. (For example, one might explain the 
holding of a particular natural law in terms of God's will, 
and then explain that will in terms of his decision to create 
an orderly cosmos.) Therefore, with the will of God a chain 
of explanations comes to a stop. (I shall treat other as­
pects of God, such as the extent of his power, separately, in 
discussing the problem of evil.)
By 'teleological explanation', I mean an explanation 
of a thing as a result of will. Normally, teleological ex­
planations are mixed with scientific explanations. But in 
the case of God, nothing but the teleological explanation is 
involved. My bare will has the power to initiate the series
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o£ physical events that result in the writing of this sen­
tence, but a complete explanation of the writing of the sen­
tence must include a scientific explanation of the physical 
events involved, as well as reference to my will. God's bare 
will has the power to bring objects into existence. In ex­
plaining the existence of the universe as a result of God's 
will, nothing is involved other than the teleological expla­
nation. God's creation of the world is therefore one case 
of a pure teleological explanation. Furthermore, if theism 
is true, then all explanation can be reduced to pure teleo­
logical explanation. Whether by reference to God's will, or 
by reference to finite wills, all phenomena can be given a 
teleological explanation. All phenomena are ultimately to 
be explained either as a result of the power inherent in fi-
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nite wills, in conjunction with natural laws willed by God.
According to theism, then, all explanation is reduc­
ible to teleological explanation. A consideration of alter­
native views necessitates a brief discussion of scientific 
explanation. A scientific explanation is (roughly) an ex­
planation of an event by recounting prior conditions and a 
natural law that under those conditions an event of that 
type will occur. More generally, scientific explanation is 
explanation derived from our observation of things in the 
world, as opposed to teleological explanation, which we un­
derstand as a result of our experience of what it is to be 
agents ourselves. Personal explanation explains why some­
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thing occurred in terms of will; scientific explanation ex­
plains what occurred as representative of a class of similar 
occurrences under similar initial conditions.
According to theism, scientific explanation is reduc­
ible to teleological explanation. What are the other possi­
ble views of their relationship? Well, teleological explana­
tion might be reducible to scientific explanation, or the two 
each might be irreducible. There might be two sort of expla­
nation, neither of which could be understood in terms of the 
other. This last alternative is, however, "messy." Both 
theism and naturalism can offer a simpler theory than is in­
volved in an ultimate duality of explanation. Simplicity is 
one reason for preferring one theory to another.
My first argument for the reasonableness of theism 
is an argument that for the libertarian, theism is the sim­
plest available world-view. If libertarianism is true, then 
teleological explanation is not reducible to scientific ex­
planation. If one is a libertarian, then one has ruled out 
all but one way of avoiding an ultimate duality of types of 
explanation.
Free will is, according to the libertarian, neither 
random, nor determined by antecedent causal factors. The no­
tion of free will has positive content only from our experi­
ence of what it is to be agents whose actions seem to fit 
neither category. An event that is neither random nor deter­
mined, that is understandable from a subjective viewpoint but
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is, from an exterior standpoint inexplicable, is not a rea­
sonable candidate for scientific explanation.
Libertarianism is a position that is within the or­
bit of reasonable philosophical debate. It is reasonable to 
be a libertarian, and if one is a libertarian, then one has 
a reason to be a theist.
A second argument I offer for the reasonableness of 
theism is that if one adopts certain reasonable philosophical 
positions, then Lueism is the most adequate available world 
view. Given certain other views, one must either explain the 
emergence of minds in the course of evolution in theistic 
terms, or deny that it has an explanation.
The coming into existence of conscious beings is the 
sort of event that we would expect to have an explanation.
The question of why consciousness exists is not one whose 
meaningfulness is in doubt. There is a way to avoid the 
question, and that is by denying that consciousness is some­
thing that has come into existence in the course of time. 
According to the process philosophers, some level of con­
sciousness is present in every existing thing. But the argu­
ments for process philosophy are not coercive.
If one is not a process philosopher then one must 
face the question of how consciousness has come to exist. A 
view which answers this question is a view with greater ex­
planatory adequacy than one that does not answer this ques­
tion and does not explain anything else not explained by the 
first view.
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The emergence of minds may be given a teleological 
explanation, as a result of the creative will of God, or it 
may be given a scientific explanation. But given a certain 
view of cause and effect, a libertarian cannot give conscious­
ness a scientific explanation. The view of cause and effect 
that 1 have in mind is the view that given adequate knowledge 
of the cause, the effect can be deduced, so that there can be 
no more in the effect than there is in the cause.
A conscious process which is free in the libertarian 
sense cannot be deduced from the existence of the sorts of 
process with which science deals. Therefore, given the view 
of causality referred to above, it cannot be the result of 
such processes. This leaves consciousness either unexplained, 
or explained in teleological terms.
Given three reasonable philosophical positions--a re­
jection of process philosophy, a certain view of causality, 
and libertarianism--one has a reason to be a theist, that the­
ism explains what, given one's other views, would otherwise 
lack explanation.
Were the construction of a cumulative case for theism 
my main subject, I would have to defend much of what I have 
said against potential criticisms I am not addressing. In 
particular, it would be crucial for me to address the issue
of the meaningfulness of using person-talk of a transcendent 
being.^ My present aim, however, is only the limited one of 
showing that there is something to be said on the side of the
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theist, even after the acknowledged failure of the tradi­
tional arguments. Reason may lead one to the view that God 
exists, and one who is so led may substitute for James’s re­
ligious hypothesis the decision to regard God as good.
CHAPTER THREE NOTES
^F. Waismann, "How I See Philosophy," quoted in 
Basil Mitchell, The Justification of Religious Belief (New 
York: Seabury Press, 1973), p. 1l.
^John Wisdom, "Gods," quoted in Mitchell, The Justi­
fication of Religious Belief, p. 45.
^This argument is developed in detail in Richard 
Swinburne, The Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1979), pp. 102-106.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MORAL EVIL
Evil may be divided into two types: moral evil and
natural evil. I define moral evil as the evil involved in 
wrong human desires and choices. I define natural evil as 
the evil for whose existence the natural laws of this cosmos 
are a necessary condition. By these definitions, I exclude 
from the category of moral evil the accomplishment of evil 
goals. I consider the desire of the would-be murderer a 
part of the problem of moral evil, but I consider the natu­
ral laws that make murder a possible act under the heading 
of natural evil. I prefer this division of evils to the 
standard division in which moral evil is defined so as to 
include both wrong desires and choices and natural laws en­
abling wrong desires and choices to have evil effects.
The solution to the problem of moral evil is to be 
found in the free will theodicy. The free will theodicy in­
volves reference to human freedom in explaining why God, if 
he is good, has created a world containing creatures who
sometimes choose to do what is evil. The version of the free
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will theodicy that I shall employ claims that a world in 
which there are free creatures, some of whom make wrong 
choices, is better than a world in which there are no free 
creatures. Free creatures have the choice to love God or 
to reject him. The choice that the non-religious man calls 
a choice between good and evil is in reality a choice for 
or against God. It is good that creatures choose to freely 
love God; but that good can exist only if there is also a 
possibility that the creatures will choose to misuse their 
freedom. God has taken the risk involved in the creation 
of free creatures, and the creatures he has produced have in 
fact misused their freedom. The free will theodicist con­
cludes that the resulting moral evil is the responsibility 
of the creatures, and not evidence against the goodness of 
God.
The free will theodicy involves assumptions that not 
everyone will accept. In saying that man is free, the the­
odicist assumes that with respect to at least some of his 
actions, man makes choices that are not determined by ante­
cedent conditions. The theodicist assumes that the good of 
having free creatures is worth risking the moral evil that 
freedom makes possible. The theodicist assumes that the 
sort of freedom that puts man beyond God's absolute control 
is necessary if man's choices are to have value. All these 
assumptions are controversial.
I shall not defend any of these assumptions. Because
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the problem of evil is a problem for the reasonableness of 
theism, I think that the theodicist is entitled to employ in 
his defense any propositions that he thinks are true and 
that are widely acknowledged to be reasonable. The assump­
tions that are made in the free will theodicy are within the 
orbit of reasonable and responsible philosophical debate. 
Therefore, in an argument to show that moral evil does not 
make belief in God's goodness unreasonable, the theodicist 
has no extra burden of proof with regard to the reasonable­
ness of his assumptions.
There are, however, three counter-arguments to the 
free will theodicy that must be met. These are as follows:
I. If God were good, he would have made man so that he 
was not tempted to do evil. He has not done so ; there­
fore he is not good.
II. If God were good, then he would have made man so 
that, though he was tempted, he never gave in to temp­
tation. He has not done so; therefore, he is not good.
III. If God were good, then he would have created just 
those people whom he foresaw would freely choose what is 
good. He has not created just those people; therefore, 
he is not good.
I shall discuss each of these arguments in turn.
I. The Argument From the Existence of Temptations
The first argument reminds me of an old Bugs Bunny 
cartoon. In that cartoon. Daffy Duck, after betraying Bugs, 
says, "I had to do it. It was a simple matter of logic. It 
was either him or me. And it obviously couldn't be me. Af­
ter all. I'm different from other people. I feel pain."
Ad
For God to create free creatures who were not tempted would 
mean creating creatures who, because of inner structure or 
outward circumstances, could never be in a position to un­
derstand that sort of "logic." Creatures who could not rea­
son in that way, or who never were in circumstances where 
such reasoning was possible, would not be morally good.
Such creatures might perform no act that was morally evil. 
They might perform acts that in our world, where temptation 
is present, would be counted morally good. But if they were 
never tempted, these creatures would not be morally good.
To build men so that they were never tempted, or to place 
them in a world where no temptations arose means building 
them so that the gift of free will is useless. God might as 
well build robots, as to make free creatures who are never 
tempted to misuse their freedom.
In his article, "Omnipotence, Evil, and Supermen," 
Ninian Smart makes this same point by sketching an imaginary 
world, Utopia.^ In Utopia, there are creatures (we could 
hardly call them humans) who are immune from temptation.
These creatures have no important desires that can come into 
conflict with the desires of others. For example, each some­
how arrives in the world with an automatic supply of goods, 
and an innate aversion to the belongings of others. Each is 
capable of desiring only one mate, and that one is the first 
unattached person of the opposite sex encountered. When dan­
ger threatens, the creatures of Utopia are so constructed
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that they respond with no emotion, and this allows them to 
always act cooly and rationally. Similar provisions may be 
imagined to cover other situations where temptations exist 
for humans.
Does anyone want to call the creatures of Utopia 
good? Why? Are they courageous? No, for they cannot fear. 
Are they generous? No, for generosity would have no meaning 
where no one desires what he does not have. Are these crea­
tures self-sacrificing for others? No, for where self- 
interest is not valued, there is no question of whether to 
put the interests of others above the interests of oneself. 
Smart concludes his sketch of Utopia with the claim that the 
creatures of Utopia are no more to be counted as good for 
failing to harm one another than are the inhabitants of Al­
pha Centuri for not harming Earthlings. Distance renders 
the Alpha Centurians (if there are any) incapable of harming 
Earthlings. More complex barriers prevent the inhabitants 
of Utopia from even conceiving of immoral actions. But it 
is irrelevant whether the restraint shown is due to distance, 
or to more complex barriers. In neither case is the behavior 
to be counted as morally good.
An interesting objection to Smart's argument ques­
tions what, on Smart's view, it would mean to say that God 
is good. If Smart is correct, then the concept of moral 
goodness can only have application to beings who undergo 
temptation. Traditionally, God has not been conceived of as
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resisting his desire to lie, or struggling to master his 
selfishness. If the theist is not willing to revise his 
concept of God along lines that would allow for God's being 
tempted, then he must deny that God is morally good.
I think that Smart is correct; I also think that if 
Smart is correct, then God is not morally good. The matter 
is not as serious for the theist as it sounds, however. It 
has never been the idea of the theist, in claiming that God 
was good, that God, like us, struggles with temptation. "God 
is good," can only mean that God's acts always conform to the 
standard of moral goodness. God's acts may be in conformity 
to the moral law, even though God is not a morally good being 
for doing them. In a religious context, "God is good," may 
also indicate that God is the supremely good (valuable) be­
ing. To achieve the vision of God is man's chief good, his 
supreme blessedness. God is not morally good, like a good 
man: but God is the good. As the good, God is praiseworthy,
but not morally praiseworthy.
An objection that I anticipate is that on this view, 
man has a desirable quality (moral goodness) that God lacks. 
The testimony of all theistic religions is that God is in 
every way superior to his creation. Therefore, this view re­
quires a major modification of traditional religious beliefs.
To this objection, I reply that given a certain view 
of ethics, the theodicist has no problem with the claim that 
man is morally good, and God is not. I shall call the view
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of ethics that I have in mind theological eudemonism.^
Theological eudemonism is teleological ethics in a 
theistic context. Teleological ethical theories hold that 
the moral good consists in what will promote the intrinsi­
cally good. Such ethical theories presuppose that there are 
deep universal needs which morally good behavior tends to 
satisfy. In many teleological ethical theories, there is 
one good which is identified as the summun bonum--man's 
highest good. Other things are considered good insofar as 
they contribute to the achievement of this intrinsic good.
Theological eudemonism holds that the meaning of 'a 
person is morally good' is that that person, faced with 
temptation to do otherwise, tends to make choices that aid 
in the achievement of the summun bonum. The reference of 
'moral good' is to that which tends to bring man into a re­
lationship of harmony with God.
The distinction between the meaning and the reference 
of moral terms is important. In making this distinction, 
theological eudemonism differs from the divine command the­
ory. According to the divine command theory, to say that 
something is good is to say that God approves it, and to say 
that something is obligatory is to say that God commands it. 
Such a theory is open to the objection that it entails that 
if God commanded men to torture one another, then to do so 
would be morally good. Theological eudemonism does not en­
tail this, because it connects the will of God with the
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reference of moral terms, not with their meaning. Theolog­
ical eudemonism assumes that God is loving, and that man is 
made, in the words of the Scottish Shorter Catechism, "to 
glorify God and to enjoy him forever." Therefore, (given 
its teleological theory of the meaning of 'good'] the refer­
ent of 'good' is to what will enable one to achieve harmony 
with the will of God. If God is not good, or if there is no 
God, then what follows is .that while theological eudemonism 
may be correct about the meaning of ethical terms, it is mis­
taken about their referent. If God commands men to torture 
one another, then what follows is not that his command makes 
torture morally good, but rather that "moral good" does not 
refer to that which will enable a man to achieve a harmoni­
ous relationship with God.^
Theological eudemonism has the advantages of making 
ethical facts objective and non-natural. I suspect that 
most people's first intuitions are that ethical claims are 
true or false (they are objective) and ethical truths cannot 
be described in the language of science (they are non-natural) 
Theological eudemonism gives an intelligible account of how 
ethical facts can be both objective and non-natural. It is 
arguably the best such account. Given that the theist al­
ready thinks that there is a loving God, it seems to me that 
he has good reason to accept theological eudemonism. If one 
accepts theological eudemonism, then there is no problem at­
tached to the claim that God is not morally good. It would
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be absurd to say that God, in the face of temptation, freely 
chooses that which will bring him into a harmonious relation­
ship with God. A relationship of harmony with God is pre­
sumably not a problem for God. It has to be a problem for 
us, in order that a human offering of love and obedience can 
be more than a puppet's response to the puppet-master. Moral 
goodness is the goodness appropriate to man, but not to God. 
Therefore, to say that man is capable of moral goodness and 
God is not is not to ascribe to man a characteristic in which 
he is superior to God.
The counter-argument to the free-will theodicy which 
was the starting point of this discussion has as its key 
premise that if God were good, he would have made man so 
that he was not tempted to do evil. To this objection I re­
plied that the concept of moral goodness makes sense only in 
connection with that of temptation. That God desires a uni­
verse in which there is moral good is sufficient reason for 
him to create man in a situation where temptations exist.
This reply gave rise to the problem of whether moral good­
ness should be ascribed to God. I answered that it should 
not, but that to say this was not to ascribe a deficiency to 
God. Defense of this claim involved consideration of the na­
ture of ethical terms. The result of that consideration was 
the conclusion that the theist has good reason to adopt the 
theory of theological eudemonism. From the perspective of 
theological eudemonism, God is not morally good, but God is
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the good. I shall continue to refer to God as good, but that 
claim is to be understood in conformity with theological eu­
demonism, as indicating that God is he who is supremely valu­
able. This in no way lessens the severity of the problem of 
evil. God could not needlessly inflict suffering on his crea­
tures, and play the role that theological eudemonism assigns 
him. Theological eudemonism does not reduce the need to de­
fend the ways of God with man.
II. The Argument from the Possibility 
of Sinless People 
The second counter argument to the free-will theodicy 
that I listed has as its key premise the claim that if God 
were good, then he would have made man so that, though he was 
tempted, he never gave in to temptation. J. L. Mackie elabo­
rates on this argument as follows:
If God has made men such that in their free choices they 
sometimes prefer what is good and sometimes what is evil, 
why could he not have made men such that they always 
freely choose the good? If there is no logical impossi­
bility in a man's freely choosing the good on one, or on 
several occasions, there can be no logical impossibility 
in his freely choosing the good on every occasion. God 
was not, then, faced with the choice between making in­
nocent automata and making beings who, in acting freely, 
would sometimes go wrong: there was open to him the ob­
viously better possibility of making beings who would 
act freely but always go right. Clearly, his failure to 
avail himself of this possibility is inconsistent with 
his being both omnipotent and wholly good.^
It is logically possible that man, though tempted, 
always does what is right. A common explanation of God's om­
nipotence is that God has the power to bring about whatever
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is logically possible. If omnipotence means power to bring 
about whatever is logically possible, then God could have had 
the advantage of free creatures whose choices had value with­
out any risk of moral evil.
This would be a fatal objection to the free-will the­
odicy only if the theodicist was bound to the understanding 
of omnipotence that this objection employs. But he is not 
bound to this understanding of omnipotence. The proper re­
sponse for the free-will theodicist is to deny that God can 
bring about all state of affairs that are logically possible.
Alvin Plantinga defends this response by arguing that 
while it is logically possible that no one ever succumbs to 
temptation, whether or not this possibility is realized is up 
to us, not to God.
Plantinga provides the following example of why he 
thinks it is we, not God, who decide whether some possibili­
ties are realized; Curley Smith, the mayor of Boston, is of­
fered a bribe. Take the entire course of the world up to the 
moment that Curley decides to accept or to reject the bribe; 
call it S. Then one of the following obtains:
1. 8, and Curley accepts the bribe.
2. S, and Curley rejects the bribe.
Both 1 and 2 involve logically possible worlds. But 
which world exists is up to Curley, and not up to God. If 
God is to create Curley, and not someone else, and to make 
him free with respect to accepting or rejecting the bribe.
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thôn Curley decides which possible world shall exist, the 
one where he accepts the bribe, or the one where he rejects 
it. Curley is, in a sense, co-creator of the world. He is 
not C O-creator of heaven and earth, and the natural laws 
that govern them. But he is co-creator in the sense that he 
has the power to determine a part of the world's history.
He, and not God, determines whether that history shall in­
clude his taking the bribe. A world in which Curley existed, 
S obtained, and Curley made a choice different from his ac­
tual choice is a logically possible world, but not a world 
that God can insure will exist. This is not a response with 
which all theists could assent. It means that humans can 
make the world turn out differently from what God intends. 
Aquinas is one of many notable theists whose God-concept 
would not allow this. However, for the theists who can ac­
cept it, I believe this argument does provide a satisfactory 
response to the second counter-argument to the free-will the­
odicy. ^
III. The Argument from God's Foreknowledge
The third counter-argument has as its key premise 
that if God were good, then he would have created just those 
people whom he foresaw would freely choose what is good.
Plantinga also offers an answer to this question, but 
in this case I think his answer less satisfactory. Plantinga 
suggests that perhaps everyone that God could create suffers 
from what Plantinga calls transworld depravity. A creature
suffers from transworld depravity, according to Plantinga, 
just in case there is no possible world in which God could 
place that creature, in which it is free, undergoes tempta­
tions, and never performs a wrong action. A world in which 
Curley is morally perfect is a possible world, but not a 
world that God can create if it is the case that in every 
world in which God could place him, Curley would choose at 
least one wrong action. Plantinga adds that it is possible 
that Curley suffers from transworld depravity. It is possi­
ble that in any world in which Curley existed and had choices 
to make between good and evil., Curley would at some point 
choose evil. If it is possible that Curley suffers from 
transworld depravity, then it is possible that we all suffer 
from it. If it is possible that all actual people suffer 
from it, then it is also possible that everyone that God 
might have created suffers from it. Though sinless people 
are a logical possibility, it may be a contingent truth that 
anyone God created would at some point freely choose to do 
wrong. It may be that anyone whom God could create would in 
fact make wrong choices, though there is nothing that makes 
it necessary that all do so. If this is the case, then it 
is beyond the power of omnipotence to create a world in which
7
free creatures subject to temptation produce no moral evil.
What Plantinga asserts concerning transworld deprav­
ity may be correct. My only quarrel with what he says is 
that he pictures God as knowing whether his creatures suffer
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from transworld depravity or not. He pictures God as being 
in a position to weigh the amount of moral evil that would 
be produced by a particular person against the good that 
might result from his creation. I think that such a picture 
is necessarily false. I hold that either God cannot know the 
truth value of propositions that refer to free future human 
decisions, or else he does know them, but in a manner that 
makes it impossible for his knowledge to affect the decision 
to create the persons involved.
If I am correct about this matter, then there is a 
more direct answer to the third counter-argument than 
Plantinga's speculation concerning transworld depravity.
That more direct answer is that God did not create just those 
people whom he foresaw would always freely choose the good 
because his doing so is impossible.
The free will theodicy assumes the truth of the lib­
ertarian view of free will. According to the Libertarian, 
it is impossible in principle to predict with certainty an­
other's free decision. "In principle" means that the inabil­
ity to predict is not due to any lack of knowledge or intel­
ligence. It is not, then due to any of those attributes in 
which God excels us. This "in principle" must include God.
If man's decisions are free, and God is in time, then 
God's predictions concerning future free human decisions are 
fallible. There is no way to give any sort of account of how 
his predictions could be otherwise. Certainty concerning
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future events, for a being in time, can come about in only 
two ways. I can be certain of a future event because I have 
decided to cause it, and it is an event that I alone have 
the power to bring about. I can be certain of a future event 
because I know that sufficient conditions exist in the pres­
ent to necessitate its occurrence. Neither of these methods 
of obtaining certainty concerning the future can apply to 
free decisions. If I am the sole cause of my decision, then 
God cannot decree that I shall decide a certain way. If I 
am free, then there is no set of antecedent conditions which 
necessitates a certain decision.
However, some theists have held that God is outside 
all time, and beholds what is to us past, present, and future 
in his one eternal present. In this case, God does know what
future free human decisions will be. He knows them because
he sees them being made. Our making them is therefore the 
necessary condition of his knowing them. God cannot behold, 
in his eternal present, a future event unless that event is 
in fact what will come to pass. This means that God cannot 
intervene at time T1 to prevent what would otherwise be your 
decision at T2; for the only reason that God can be certain 
of your decision at T2 is that it is the decision that will 
in fact be made. This rules out God's interfering with that 
decision on the basis of his knowledge of it.
From the point of view of an atemporal God, the uni­
verse for which he provides ontological support is, from the
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first moment to the last, a single accomplished fact. An 
atemporal God is the Eternal Spectator. His single act is 
the eternal willing of the existence of the spatio-temporal 
order. What exists, and what laws govern things are "built- 
in" in that eternal willing of the world, and cannot take 
into account the specific actions of free creatures such as 
he has willed that the world produce. Such a God might an­
swer prayer, but only by creating a world where praying in a 
certain way, under certain circumstances, would cause certain 
events to always follow. Such a God might build into the 
world the possibility of miracles, but only by eternally 
willing that certain circumstances, if they arose, would re­
sult in the failure of certain natural laws. An atemporal 
God might inspire sacred writings, but only by willing from 
eternity that certain truths be available to anyone who made 
certain decisions, or was in certain circumstances.
Either God is in time or outside time. If God is in 
time, then he does not know with certainty future free human 
decisions. If God is outside time, then God does know future 
free human decisions, but his knowledge is dependent on the 
future event's being, from his point of view, already accom­
plished fact. On neither hypothesis can God be imagined as 
deciding before creation whether to create certain individuals, 
based on knowledge of exactly what would happen if he did so. 
Therefore, whether God is in time, or outside time, he does 
not have the choice of creating people he knows will only do 
good.
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The free-will theodicy can give reasonable answers 
to the counter-arguments that can be mustered against it. It 
therefore succeeds in showing that it is reasonable to think 
that a good God might create a world containing creatures who 
make evil choices. There is, therefore, for theists willing 
to accept the free-will theodicy, no significant problem of 
moral evil for belief in the goodness of God.
Faith in the goodness of God is rational unless God’s 
being good is overwhelmingly improbable. The existence of 
moral evil does nothing to show that God’s being good is im­
probable. The more significant problem of evil is the prob­
lem of natural evil.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
NATURAL EVIL
If, as I argued in chapter four, God's permission of 
moral evil can be explained, then any significant problem of 
evil must be based on the presence in our universe of various 
natural evils. I define "natural evils" as the evils for 
which natural laws are a necessary condition. Natural evils 
include both things like earthquakes and disease, and events 
like murder in which natural laws make it possible for people 
to carry out those evil decisions that constitute moral evil.
I attempted to explain why God has created a world 
in which there is moral evil. I shall not try to explain why 
God has created a world in which there is natural evil. In­
stead, I shall argue that we do not have sufficient knowledge 
to judge from the presence of natural evil in the world that 
God's being good is overwhelmingly improbable. My argument 
for this conclusion is as follows;
1. Given that there are many natural evils, to eliminate 
a significant number of them would require that God pro­
duce a radically different world from the one that we 
know.
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2. To know that it is overwhelmingly probable that God, 
if he were good, would produce a radically different 
world from the one that we know, we would have to know:
I. that it is overwhelmingly probable that a radi­
cally different world would have less evil in it 
than the world that we know.
II. that it is overwhelmingly probable that a radi­
cally different world with less evil in it is 
one that could be produced by God.
III. that it is overwhelmingly probable that a radi­
cally different world, with less evil in it, 
which God could produce, would be a world that 
a good God would produce.
3. We do not know what we would need to know to judge 
that it is overwhelmingly probable that a good God would 
produce a radically different world from the one that we 
know.
4. Therefore, we cannot judge, from God's not producing 
a world without significantly fewer natural evils, that 
God's being good is overwhelmingly improbable.
The crucial claim in this argument is the claim that 
we do not have the knowledge to judge that it is overwhelming­
ly probable that a good God would produce a radically diffe­
rent world. The lack of knowledge that the argument refers 
to is of three types. We are said to not have a sufficient 
grasp of the comparative balance of good and evil in a radi­
cally different world; we are said to not have a sufficient 
grasp of what worlds God is capable of creating; and we are 
said to not have a sufficient grasp of what sort of world a 
good God would be obligated to create. I shall devote sepa­
rate sub-sections of this chapter to each of these points.
I. Good and Evil in a Radically Different World
To compare the balance of good and evil in a world
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radically different from our own, we need to know two things: 
the balance of good and evil in our own world, and the bal­
ance of good and evil in the world in question. There are 
problems on both counts.
There are possible scientific discoveries that would 
upset our present estimates of the proportion of good and 
evil in our world. For example, suppose that it were dis­
covered that in cases of massive injury, where there is no 
hope of recovery, the brain produced an opium derivative to 
mask the pain. It seems to me that this would make some dif­
ference in our view of how much evil our world contains.
Another possible discovery is that certain diseases 
are self-inflicted in the sense that at some level we control 
our bodies' defense mechanisms against disease, and sometimes 
"decide" to become ill. I, for one, am inclined to judge God 
far more harshly for creating a world containing evils that 
strike at random than I am for its containing the possibility 
of self-inflicted evils. A discovery that some instances of 
disease were self-inflicted would change, to some degree at 
least, my own estimate of this world's balance of good and 
evil. The possibility of such discoveries should reduce our 
confidence in our ability to estimate our world's balance of 
good and evil.
Another problem with confidently asserting that a 
radically different world would have less evil in it than 
our world is our ignorance of how much weight to give animal
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pain in weighing out world against various alternatives.
The pain suffered in the animal world seems on the 
face of it, to present a special problem to the theodicist. 
Animal reactions to pain are very much like our own. This 
makes it difficult to dispose of the problem of animal pain 
by denying that their experience is necessarily as painful as 
our own would be in similar circumstances. On the other hand, 
animals seem to lack the characteristics that would make a 
"character training," theodicy applicable to them.
It seems to me that the difficulty of this problem is 
at least reduced by th.e reflection that animals either have a 
level of conscious complexity comparable to our own, or they 
do not. If they do, then they may be like us in having free 
will and in being presented with some version, however primi­
tive, of the choice between living for self or surrender of 
their wills to God. If they do not, then the similarity of 
their outward reaction may not be an indication of an identi­
cal subjective experience. If the latter alternative is cor­
rect, then we cannot be certain how radically animal experi­
ence of pain differs from our own. (It still seems probable, 
however, that animals suffer a great deal. Animal pain is 
one of the most perplexing parts of the problem of evil.)
Another problem with judging our world's balance of 
good and evil is our uncertainty concerning the correctness 
of our own value judgments. Growing up is in part an expe­
rience of revising one's values. It is an experience that
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leaves one open to the possibility that the future will 
•teach new lessons and revise some judgements that seem at 
present unshakeable. A confident statement that a radically 
different world from our own would exhibit a better balance 
of good over evil encounters the problem of whether we have 
yet reached a standpoint from which such a value-judgment 
could confidently be made.
I can supply a personal example of how a change in 
my value-judgments made a difference for me in my judgments 
of how much evil the world contains.
I have always been fascinated and horrified by ac­
counts of Nazi Germany, and by the concentration camps. I 
once put this evil in a special category. That Hitler was 
allowed to exist and to murder so many people struck me as 
an evil in the face of which theodicy was impossible.
Now the interesting thing is that I did not consider 
it an evil beyond possible justification that God allows 
moral evil. Nor did I consider it totally impossible to jus­
tify God's governing the world by means of natural laws that 
would sometimes have the result that moral evil could be ex­
pressed in terms of evil acts. I had not analyzed why the 
existence of the concentration camps seemed to me to be so 
impossible to reconcile with the existence of a good God. 
Eventually, as I grew up, I discovered why I had this reac­
tion. It was because I had never accepted the universality 
of death.
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Put into words, the idea is ridiculous, but I felt 
about death, not that it was something that occurs to all, 
but that it was some sort of terrible exception to the gener­
al rule. The pain inflicted in the concentration camps did 
not strike me as nearly as great an evil as the sheer numbers 
of people who died.
But of course every one of the millions killed by 
Hitler would have died anyway. All were under a death sen­
tence whether Hitler ever came to power or not. The evil 
about murder is not that someone is dead, but that someone 
else is a murderer.. The evil of the concentration camps is 
the evil of the pain suffered there, and the staggering 
amount of moral evil involved in their construction and op­
eration. The terrible thing is not that six million Jews 
died, but that six million people were, after great suffer­
ing, murdered.
In order to judge whether a radically different world 
from the one that we know would be a superior world, we would 
have to have at least a rough idea of the balance of good and 
evil in our world. I have argued that there are difficulties 
in ascertaining our world's balance of good and evil. How­
ever, the difficulties are slight compared with the diffi­
culty of judging the balance of good and evil in a radically 
different world. The difficulty of this latter task provides 
the strongest reason for doubting that we can confidently 
judge the benefits of various possible worlds.
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Bruce Reichenbach writes of the difficulty of imag­
ining an orderly cosmos radically different from our own as 
follows :
. . .  it is not enough for the sceptic merely to say 
concerning a particular natural . . . event that he can 
conceive how it could have turned out better than it 
did. . . .  An entire set of natural laws and all the 
events affected by them will have to be altered for an 
effect different from that which did occur to result. 
. . .  If the sceptic is to conceive of a better world 
what he must do, first, is develop other possible world- 
systems of natural law and/or different components, and 
secondly show that a given system (not an event, or 
class of events, but the system) would result in less 
evil than the present world-system. . . . To do this 
would necessitate knowing all the implications of both 
natural systems, a task suited only for an omniscient 
mind.^
The alternative to trying to imagine a world with 
radically different natural laws is trying to imagine a 
world like our own, but in which God is constantly inter­
vening to prevent natural evils. In such a world, one could 
swim in water, but not drown in water; the knife that re­
mained hard when cutting butter would turn to rubber when 
picked up in anger; vocal cords would not respond when one
attempted to shape hateful, malicious words.
It is difficult to imagine life in a world so diffe­
rent. Certainly, such a world would lack many of the fea­
tures that we wish were eliminated from our world. Certain­
ly, too, it would lack some good features of our world. It 
would lack the search for truth. To eliminate a significant 
number of natural evils would necessitate turning the world
into what F. R. Tennant called "a chaos of incalcuable
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miracle," in which science would not be possible. It would
be a world in which men had no real responsibilities for one
another. One would not have the decision of whether to hurt
or help one's fellows. All would depend on miracle; no man
would depend on others. There would be no abandoned babies 
in such a world; but neither would there by any cared-for ba­
bies, since a human's failing to change or feed a baby would 
have no bad effects. To the degree that we can imagine it, 
this would be a universe resembling a womb.
The difficulty of deciding whether such a world would 
be preferable is based on the problem of what ^  would be in 
such a world. Of attempts to imagine such a world, J. A.
Baker writes :
The way in which we react to events is just as much a 
part of our experience of them as the events themselves. 
When, therefore, we are asked to compare a system under 
which we have never lived with one that is our permanent 
environment--in this case, a pain-free universe with one 
suph as we now have--we do not have the basis on which 
to make the evaluation . . . our guess about the effects 
of such a change become highly tentative.3
For all the reasons that I have listed, I do not 
think it overwhelmingly probable that a radically different 
world would have a better balance of good over evil than the 
one that we know. Suppose, however, that it is overwhelmingly 
probable. The question still remains as to whether it is 
overwhelmingly probable that a radically different world with 
less evil in it would be a world that God would be capable of 
creating. To decide this question requires a discussion of 
the notion of omnipotence.
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II. What God Can Do 
What does it mean to say, as theologians commonly 
do, that God is omnipotent? A quick definition of omnipo­
tence is that it is the power, attributed to God, of being 
able to do anything. Some take "anything" literally, as any­
thing at all, including the logically impossible. Others 
concede that there have to be some logical restrictions on 
the scope of "anything." Three explanations of omnipotence 
that one can find in the literature on the subject are as 
follows :
1. God can do anything, including that which implies a 
contradiction.
2. God can do task X, if X can be given a logically 
consistent description.
3. God can do X if the sentence "God does X" is logi­
cally consistent.
This first understanding of omnipotence is one of
those troublesome philosophical positions whose absurdity is
combined with complete security from refutation. It cannot
be refuted by showing that it has absurd or contradictory
consequences, since what the doctrine asserts is precisely
that the contradictory may be the case, if God so wills it.
Peter Geach writes that, whenever anyone tells him that God
can do anything, he reminds them of the Biblical passage that
God cannot lie. So far, he reports, none has had the wit to
reply that since God can do anything, he can both lie, and be 
unable to lie.^ Such a reply is always open to the defender 
of this understanding of omnipotence. Suppose one presented
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a proponent of this doctrine with a valid argument that had 
premises he agreed were true, and the conclusion that God was 
not omnipotent. He could always reply that God could make 
the premises true and the conclusion false.
The position in question is therefore logically in­
vulnerable. The only thing that one can do with it is to try 
to remove the motivation for assenting to it. That motiva­
tion was, I think, correctly described by Whitehead: "Among
medieval and modern philosophers, anxious to establish the 
religious significance of God, an unfortunate habit has per­
sisted of paying to Him metaphysical compliments. The "ref­
utation" of the first definition of omnipotence is an explana­
tion that it is no lack of power in God that keeps him from 
performing a task whose description implies a contradiction.
It is not because God lacks power, but because the speaker 
has not succeeded in specifying a real task to be done or not 
done that a contradictory task does not fall under the heading 
of things that God can do.
The second characterization of omnipotence is ini­
tially more plausible. It is one of the most common under­
standings of omnipotence, as shown by people's willingness to 
draw the conclusion that God can perform a task from the mere 
premise that the task is not in itself logically impossible. 
Peter Geach summarizes the problem with this understanding of 
omnipotence as follows :
there are well-known logical arguments to show that . . .
there must be some logically possible feats that are
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beyond God's power. One good example suffices: making
a thing which its maker cannot afterwards destroy. This 
is certainly a possible feat, a feat that some human be­
ings have performed. Can God perform the feat or not?
If he cannot there is already some logically possible 
feat which God cannot perform. If God can perform the 
feat, then let us suppose that he does. . . . Then we 
are supposing God to have brought about a situation in 
which he has made something he cannot destroy; and in 
this situation destroying this thing is a logically pos­
sible feat that God cannot accomplish. . . .0
The third definition of omnipotence is designed to 
avoid precisely this sort of objection. Its defenders recog­
nize that "God does X" may be inconsistent, even though X is, 
in itself, logically possible. This definition states that 
God can do whatever it is logically consistent to say that 
God does. This definition avoids the sort of counter example 
that disposed of the second definition. While it is consis­
tent to say that something can be made that its maker cannot 
destroy, there is an inconsistency in saying that God makes 
something that God cannot destroy. It is equivalent to say­
ing that he who can destroy anything makes that which he can­
not destroy.
However, this formula still ascribes to God power 
that he may have. If libertarianism is true, then what a 
free being does is up to that being, and not to God. "God 
creates sinless people with free wills" is logically consis­
tent, but it is a sad truth of logic that if people are free 
it is up to them and not to God, whether there are sinless 
people. "God creates sinless people with free wills" is log­
ically consistent, but if everyone God creates in fact
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chooses to sin, then God cannot create sinless people. God 
cannot create sinless persons unless the persons that God 
create choose not to sin; and whether or not they do so is 
beyond God's control, since he has given them free wills.
We might seek to amend this definition of omnipo­
tence, so as to evade this counter-example. We then might 
consider what counter-examples, if any, the new definition 
was subject to. But what has been said so far is sufficient 
to show that defining omnipotence is no easy matter. The 
question arises as to why we should try to capture in a defi­
nition what God can and cannot do.
One answer might be that God's omnipotence must be
defined in a way that gives God sufficient power to make him
worthy of human worship. We must look for a formula that
will define the limits of the tasks that God can perform, in
order to see if our God-concept is the concept of a deity
that is worthy of being worshiped by us. This seems near to
what C. A. Campbell intends when he writes:
the religious attitudes of worship and adoration are dif­
ficult to sustain in conjunction with an explicit recog­
nition that the Being to whom they are directed is defec­
tive or imperfect in any way whatever. And we can hardly 
pretend to ourselves that limitation of power is not an 
imperfection.?
This seems to me to be mistaken. There is no moral 
principle that says that one ought to offer worship to a be­
ing only if that being is one who has X amount of power.
That people are psychologically capable of worshiping what is 
limited is indicated by the worshipful or near-worshipful
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attitudes that many people evidence towards actors, politi­
cians, and famous musicians. Furthermore, even if one assumed 
that a certain degree of power was a necessary condition for 
one to be worthy of worship, there does not seem to be any 
obvious way to go from the premise that God is worship-worthy 
only if he has X amount of power to the conclusion that God 
has that amount of power.
I can think of no possible justification for ascrib­
ing to God more power than is entailed by the role that God 
plays in our metaphysical scheme. The God-concept that I have 
been employing, and on behalf of which I have offered a par­
tial argument, is the concept of a will that is the explana­
tion for the existence of all other things that exist. This 
means that God is either a necessary or a sufficient condi­
tion for whatever is the case. He is the sufficient condi­
tion for all states of affairs that do not involve the deci­
sions of free creatures. He is a necessary condition for all 
states of affairs that also have as a cause the free decision 
of a creature. It follows that no power can be superior to 
that of God. The existence of any power other than that of 
God is dependent upon God's will. God's role as ultimate ex­
planatory terminus also gives us a reason to ascribe a great 
deal of knowledge to God: knowledge of all that he wills,
which is to say all that exists.
God's role as the place where explanation stops indi­
cates a degree of power that we can be justified in ascribing
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to him, but it does not provide a formula like those we be­
gan by considering. That is, it does not provide us with a 
formula of the form "God can do any task X that has charac­
teristic Y." I shall not provide such a formula. The con­
cept of God that I employ is that of a power that cannot be 
successfully opposed by any competing power. This tells us 
what is the minimum of God’s power, but gives us no justifi­
cation to make dogmatic judgments about what God can or can­
not do.
In the chapter on moral evil, I give an example of a 
limitation on God’s powers. I argue that God either does 
not know future free human decision, or else knows them in a 
manner which makes impossible his interference based on that 
knowledge. This limitation on God’s knowledge, or on his 
power (depending on which horn of the dilemma one chooses) 
is by no means obvious. That it is arguably the case sug­
gests that a healthy skepticism is in order concerning gen­
eralizations about God’s powers.
Another reason for not being dogmatic about what God 
can and cannot do is that the power that one can justifiably 
ascribe to God does not rule out the existence of metaphysi­
cal truths that may limit God. One candidate for such a truth 
is the claim that the whole is always greater than its parts. 
It is not logically impossible for a part to be equivalent to 
the whole. Two sets are equivalent if their members can be 
put into one to one correspondence with one another. A part
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of a set with an infinite number of members (say the odd- 
numbered elements) can be put into one-to-one correspondence 
with the whole. Therefore, in an infinite set, a part can 
be equivalent to the whole.
This is logically possible; but can it be true of 
any real thing? There are counter-intuitive results from an­
swering "yes." God might have existed for an infinite amount 
of time, and God might, like Tristram Shandy, record the 
events of a single day in his infinite life every year. Re­
cording events at this pace, God would always have an up-to- 
date record, since the set of years God has existed and the 
set of days that God has existed would be equivalent. Both 
are infinite.
This is counter-intuitive, but not contradictory.
One may simply conclude that this is a strange but real pos­
sibility for a God who has always existed. However, another 
response is to conclude that there must be a form of absolute 
necessity other than the logical that is binding even on God,
and that one truth having such necessity is that in whatever
0
is real, the whole is greater than the part.
If the principle that the whole is greater than its 
parts is a necessary metaphysical truth, then no real thing 
can be infinite. Anything that is infinite would violate 
this principle. God cannot, therefore, create an infinite 
number of things. God cannot know all possible worlds, since 
these are infinite in number. There is the possible world
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with one thing in it, the possible world with two things in 
it, the possible world with three things in it, and so on. 
There is the infinite number of worlds that have life in 
them, the infinite number of worlds in which the same natural 
laws operate as in ours, the infinite number of worlds in 
which moral virtue is possible, and the infinite number of 
worlds that share the same past as ours up to a certain point 
in its history. If the part cannot be greater than the whole 
then God knows only some finite number of these worlds. It 
follows that Leibniz is wrong: God does not know whether
ours is the best world he might have created. We can accept 
the paradoxical consequences of affirming that real things 
may be infinite, or assert that there is a necessity other 
than the logical which rules out a real infinite. The cor­
rect choice here is not obvious. Therefore, what God can do 
is also not obvious.
A third reason to be agnostic concerning the power 
of God is our inability to detect which features of our uni­
verse are logically necessary. In saying this, I am assuming 
that at least some features of the world are as they are be­
cause of metaphysical truths. Now there are metaphysical 
theories that would determine what is logically possible.
For example, if minds are essentially complex configurations 
of matter, then dualism is not only false, but necessarily 
false. If dualism is true, then minds are essentially non­
material, and mind-body identity theories make the necessarily
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false claim that what is essentially non-material is material.
A metaphysical theory with very obvious and direct 
implications for the power of God is that of Whitehead and 
Hartshorne. According to these thinkers, to exist means to 
have some degree of power to determine one's own nature and 
to influence others. These thinkers deny that a powerless 
entity is conceivable. The limit their doctrine imposes is, 
they claim, a logical limit.^ If to be is to have power, 
then the idea of a powerless entity is the logically contra­
dictory idea of power without power. If this is correct, 
then it is logically impossible for God to create and also 
to have complete control over the subsequent history of his 
creation. Writing on this subject, Hartshorne says that 
omnipotence :
is sometimes viewed as a monopolistic concentration of 
power--the wielding, by one agent, of all the power 
there is or could be. This implies that all other be­
ings are powerless. But if 'being is power' (Plato), 
then power over being is power over power, and the 
ideal or perfect agent will enjoy the optimal concen­
tration of efficacy which is compatible with there be­
ing other efficacious a g e n t s .10
I am not a follower of Whitehead. I do not employ 
this Whiteheadian idea to resolve the problem of evil. Ref­
erence to Whitehead's metaphysics is intended only to illus­
trate that without a complete metaphysics, we cannot assume 
that what seems logically possible logically possible. If 
we cannot decide with certainty what is logically possible, 
then we cannot afford to be dogmatic about what things, which 
seem to us to be imaginable, could actually have been done by
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God. We cannot know that it is overwhelmingly improbable 
that the apparently consistent world of our imagination, in 
which there is no natural evil and a better balance of good 
over evil than our own world, is a world that could actually 
have been created by God.
Let us assume, however, that there is some logically 
possible world, lacking natural evil, and having a better 
balance of good over evil than our world. Let us assume, 
too, that this is a world that God could create. Is it ob­
viously the case that a good God would create that world?
This question brings us to the topic of what sort of world a
good God would be obligated to create.
III. Must God Create the Best?
I have used as the title of this section the same 
title as an article by Robert Merrihew Adams. In his arti­
cle, Adams answers the question asked by the title in the
negative. Adams asks us to suppose that God created a world
with the following characteristics:
1. None of the individual creatures in it would exist 
in the best of all possible worlds.
2. None of the creatures in it has a life which is so 
miserable on the whole that it would be better for that 
creature if it had never existed.
3. Every individual creature in the world is at least 
as happy on the whole as it would have been in any pos­
sible world in which it could have existed.
Adams suggests that a good God might choose to create 
such a world, even though it was not the best world that he
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could have created. In creating such a world, God would not 
be wronging any of the creatures in it. After all, their 
lives are worth living, and they would not exist if God in­
sisted on not creating an inferior world. Neither does God 
wrong any superior beings whom he might have created by cre­
ating such a world. One cannot injure a creature who never 
exists. Therefore, a good God could create an inferior 
world without wronging any creature. I would want to make 
some changes in Adam's characterization of an inferior world 
that a good God could create. The first point on the list 
would have to be revised to read "a better world," rather 
than the best of all possible worlds; I agree with those who 
think that the notion of a best of all possible worlds, like 
the notion of the largest possible number, is nonsense. Al­
so, since a creature's happiness is in part a result of his 
own free choices, I think the third point on the list should 
be modified to read that every individual creature in that 
world has at least as much opportunity for happiness as he 
would have had in any possible world in which he would have 
existed. Given these modifications, I think Adams has suc­
ceeded in specifying an inferior world that God could create 
without having wronged any creature.
Adam's argument brings up a number of fascinating is­
sues. For example, should we count Helen Keller as enough of 
the same person, in a world where she always retains all her 
senses, for us to judge that God wronged her by creating her
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in this world rather than that one? Though in both she 
would have the same bare metaphysical identity, it is 
tempting to say that even though the Helen Keller who re­
tained her senses would be a happier person, she is not 
enough the same person that failure to create the physically 
whole Helen Keller can be counted as wronging the actual 
Helen Keller.
But to return to the main issue: could a good God
create a world inferior to one that he might have created?
The only reason I can see for denying it would be if the 
only motivation for doing so was evil. If, for example, the 
only possible reason that God could have for creating an in­
ferior world was that he was envious, and wanted nothing else 
in existence to be too good, then we would have to conclude 
that a good God would not create an inferior world.
Adams answers the question of God's motivation by
bringing into the discussion the theological notion of 
1 "5grace. Grace is God's forgiveness of those who do not de­
serve forgiveness. In this context, it apparently indicates 
a willingness to create creatures who are less worthy than 
those God might have created. However, whereas forgiveness 
of the undeserving is a virtue, creation of the inferior is 
not. Talk of grace in this context can appear to provide a 
reason for the creation of an inferior world only because of 
equivocation.
I do think, though, that perhaps there is justification
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for God to create a world inferior to one that he might have 
created.
In making this claim, I presuppose three things:
first, that there is a finite number of kinds of goods; sec­
ond, that God could create any number of instances of a par­
ticular good; and third, that some goods are mixed goods, 
that is, goods whose existence is logically dependent upon 
the existence of some evil. An example of a mixed good 
would be courage, which could not exist without danger.
Given that God could create any number of things, 
there can be no such thing as a best of all possible worlds. 
For any world containing X number of goods, there is a world 
with X + 1 goods. It follows that the number of goods in a
world of a particular type is arbitrary.
The decision that God has that is not arbitrary is 
whether to create some instances of each kind of good thing, 
or to create only those goods which are not mixed goods, such 
as pure beauty. A world without any mixed goods would be a 
world with a better balance of good over evil than our world: 
it would be a world with some good, and no evil. But it seems 
to me at least possible that a good God might give up the best 
possible balance of good and evil because he loved each type 
of good, and wanted there to be some instances of each, in­
cluding mixed goods. Something like the principle of plenti- 
tude might be valid after all. It seems false that God has 
created every possible species, as that principle has it.
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However, it might be true that God desired some instances of 
all types of good. In another article on the problem of evil, 
Adams writes: " . . .  the existence of creatures such as we
are, with the characteristic, subtle, and sometimes bitter­
sweet values and beauties of human life may also be a good 
. . . that is loved by G o d . E v e n  if God could have cre­
ated a better world by creating only unmixed goods, I would 
not judge that God was not good for creating the mixed goods 
of human life as well.
We are uncertain of what God has done; we are uncer­
tain of how our world might compare with other possible 
worlds. We are uncertain of what God can do; there may be 
possible worlds that God cannot create. We are uncertain 
what a good God would do; we are uncertain of what sort of 
world a good God would be limited to creating. Given these 
uncertainties, I conclude that God's being good is not made 
overwhelmingly improbable by the presence of natural evils 
in the world.
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE PROBLEM OF GOOD
The approach to the problem of evil that I have taken 
involves a separation of the questions of God's existence and 
his goodness. I have already written at length of one advan­
tage of this approach: it allows us to assign acceptance of
God's existence to reason and acceptance of his being good to 
faith. Another advantage is that on this approach the ques­
tion raised by the presence of evil in the world is the ques­
tion of whether God is good or evil. To this question, the 
good things that exist are as relevant as are the evil 
things. If God is good, then there is a problem of evil; 
but if God is evil, then there is a problem of good. Other 
ways of approaching the problem of evil make it difficult to 
recognize the evidential value of the good things in deciding 
whether it is rational to have faith that God is good.
John Hick's influential book, Evil and the God of
Love, illustrates how failure to divide the questions of God's
existence and his goodness leads to a denial that there is a
problem of good. Hick denies that it is relevant to the
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problem of evil to make a list of the many goods in the uni­
verse.^ Hick denies that such a list is relevant to the 
problem because the question that he has set out to answer 
is "Is there a good God, or no God?" In dealing with this 
question, it is true that there is no problem of good to re­
lax somewhat the tension of the mystery of evil. If our op­
tions are a God who is by definition good, or no God at all, 
then evil is evidence against the existence of God, but the 
good things are not evidence for God. One who thinks that 
God is good must give some account of how his belief squares 
with the evils around us. The one who thinks that there is 
no God need not explain the presence of good. For the athe­
ist, this mixture of good and evil are simply what the roll 
of the dice has produced.
If, however, belief in the existence of a personal 
creator can be defended, then the situation is transformed. 
Those who believe that there is such a being will regard both 
the good and the evil as potential clues to his nature. 
Therefore, both the good and the evil in our world must be 
taken into account in making a decision about whether faith 
in God's goodness is a rational faith.
Basil Mitchell tells a parable which exhibits the 
logic of the problem of evil. Mitchell asks us to imagine a 
member of a resistance movement in an occupied country meet­
ing a mysterious stranger. The stranger tells him that he is 
on the side of the resistance movement, and that whatever
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happens, the partisan should trust him. Later the stranger 
reappears at various times. Sometimes he is actively helping 
the partisans. Sometimes he is in the uniform of the enemy, 
and is seen turning resistance fighters over to the occupying 
power. When the stranger helps the resistance movement, the 
partisan tells his fellows, "See, I told you he was on our 
side." When he is seen apparently aiding the enemy, the par­
tisan insists that the stranger must have some good reason
2for his actions.
The point that Mitchell is making in the parable is 
that there is no crucial incident after which we can say that 
the partisan's faith in the stranger has becom irrational. 
Given a certain number of incidents that seemed to show that 
the stranger was an enemy, it should eventually become irra­
tional to have faith in the stranger. But no one can say a 
priori when that point would come, and reasonable men might 
disagree about the matter. Mitchell thinks the same can be 
said in the case of faith that God is good. We can all 
agree that there is a ratio of evil over good that would 
make faith irrational. But reasonable men can and do dis­
agree about whether the balance of good and evil in this world 
does or does not exhibit that proportion.
There are several aspects of Mitchell's parable that 
do not accord with traditional presentations of the problem 
of evil. These aspects do fit with an approach like that 
which I have taken. In the parable, the existence of the
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stranger is not in doubt. It is his intentions that are in 
doubt. The stranger sometimes seems to act to harm the cause 
of the resistance forces, and this is evidence that his in­
tentions are bad. But he is also sometimes seen helping 
them, and this provides evidence too, only the other way. If 
the stranger was never seen helping the partisans, or if 
there was some reason to rule out these cases as evidence of 
his intentions, then to have faith in the friendliness of the 
stranger would be irrational. It is crucial, in the stranger 
parable, that there is evidence for, as well as against, the 
stranger's being on the partisan's side. It is also crucial 
for the rationality of faith that there is evidence for, as 
well as against, God's being good.
To what degree does the evil around us make it prob­
able that God is not good? To answer this question, we must 
look at both the good and the evil that exists. In doing so, 
we must be sure that we allow to the theodicist the use of 
the same sort of argument as we do his opponents.
The arguments on both sides of the question employ a 
special concept of probability. This sort of probability is 
not statistical probability. We cannot decide that God's be­
ing good is overwhelmingly improbable in the same way in 
which we would decide that the rolling of snake eyes a hun­
dred times in a row is overwhelmingly improbable. The sort 
of probability that is involved here is harder to character­
ize. We might call this non-statistical probability "common-
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sense” or "intuitive probability."
Having a theory of what this sort of probability 
judgment involves is not necessary before one may make the 
judgment. We can know that certain evidence makes a claim 
overwhelmingly probable without ever giving a thought to 
what, in the abstract, is the correct analysis of the nature 
of such judgments. I intend to leave alone the philosophi­
cal issues surrounding those probability judgments which 
cannot be understood in terms of frequency. What is impor­
tant for my case is that there ^  a type of probability that 
cannot be analyzed in terms of statistical frequency, and 
this type of probability is what is involved in the claim 
that God's being good is overwhelmingly improbable.
Arguments employing common-sense probability do not 
have the neat form of arguments like "Nine of ten swans ex­
amined have been white, so swan number eleven will probably 
be white." Sometimes, the arguments employed seem less like 
arguments than attempts to weave a spell of words in order to 
induce a sudden shift in perspective. In many cases, the 
arguer can do no more than point out certain aspects of an 
issue which suggest certain things to him, in the hope that 
they will be similarly suggestive to the reader. There may 
be no logical road down which the reader may be coerced from 
the factors cited to conclusions identical with those of the 
arguer.
The important point to note is that the case against
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God and the case for him are both of this nature. Statisti­
cal probability cannot be applied to universes. With the 
failure of the inconsistency argument from evil, one who 
wishes to argue that faith in God's goodness is irrational 
must employ an appeal to intuitive probability. Given that 
the case against faith is of this nature, there can be no 
objection to making a similar case for faith. The problem 
of good, which I offer as evidence for faith, cannot be ob­
jected to on the grounds that it is not a standard deductive 
or inductive argument. The counter-evidence I offer is of 
exactly the same nature as the evidence on the other side.
Our question is whether God, whose existence we are 
assuming, is good or evil. Given God's existence, it is as 
legitimate to argue from the character of his creation to 
his nature as it would be to argue from the appearance of a 
bit of pottery to the nature of the culture that produced it. 
This point must be kept in mind because many of the features 
of the universe which comprise the problem of good are fea­
tures which are commonly employed in teleological arguments 
for the exsitence of God. Objections against the teleologi­
cal argument are not relevant where the character and not 
the existence of God is what is in question, but the simi­
larity of the considerations being appealed to may make it 
difficult to keep the difference between the logic of the 
two cases separate.
One reason to think that God is good is the evidence
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that he has intended the existence of conscious, free, moral 
beings. Life itself does not appear to be a by-product of 
some process having a different end. Instead, the conspir­
acy of numerous causes in the inorganic world to produce the 
organic seems a clue that the aim was life. The evolution 
of life that produced a conscious, free, moral being is a 
strong indication of the creator's intention. It is diffi­
cult to see how a creature free in the libertarian sense 
could be a by-product of natural laws instituted by God for 
other ends. There are no plausible candidates for such laws 
or such ends. It is therefore plausible to suppose that at 
least one aim of creation was the production of free, con­
scious beings. The existence of such beings is a good, and 
therefore evidence of goodness in the creator.
The cosmos in which man has been placed is one in 
which order prevails. This regularity is necessary for man 
to be able to calculate the effects of his actions, pursue 
ends, form habits, and develop his intellect. Together with 
the presence of temptations, and the possession of free will, 
the regularity of nature gives man an opportunity to have 
real responsibility. It is good that the universe is not "a 
chaos of incalculable miracle,"^ but instead an orderly cos­
mos in which man has real responsibilities, and potential 
for doing both good and evil.
Paradoxically, the presence of a certain amount of 
evil is a part of the problem of good. This is because there
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are certain good things that are logically dependent for 
their existence on the presence of some evil. These are 
such things as courage, sympathy, and self-sacrifice. Here,
I make a value judgment with which I know that many would 
disagree. Though some evil is a logical precondition for 
these goods, I think that a world with these goods is better 
than a world without them.
The true degree to which we value those virtues 
which consist in the overcoming of hardships is, I think, 
revealed by the invention of what amounts to a pleasure ma­
chine . Scientists have placed wires in the pleasure centers 
of the brains of rats, and rigged a device that sent an elec­
tric current through these wires when a bar was pushed. The 
animals responded by pressing the bar without stopping for 
food or rest until they fell dead of hunger and exhaustion.
What would one think of a person who, after making 
provision for the care of his body, spent the remainder of 
his days hooked to such a machine? If we recoil from the 
idea, it is not because there is more pleasure to be gained 
in a normal life. We recoil because we value too much those
goods which are bound up with the problems of ordinary life.
The beauty of nature is another evidence of the good­
ness of the creator. It is not probable that it is an acci­
dental by-product of the order of the universe. Man's own 
productions, when he is unconcerned with beauty, show how 
easy it is to produce order without beauty. (Most factories
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are good examples of this.) When man is indifferent to 
beauty, he almost never produces it; if, by hypothesis, we 
assume that God is indifferent to beauty, then we have the 
mystery of why he nevertheless has almost never failed to 
achieve it.^
We cannot see beauty at will. The object which we 
say is beautiful is something that has evoked a response 
from us. For that to occur, it must have a certain charac­
ter, and we must have an ability to appreciate that charac­
ter. Biologically, a sense of beauty is superfluous. It is 
not the case that we have it because without it we would not 
have survived. In a utilitarian cosmos, beauty is a marve­
lous "extra.
If I were God, and I wanted to create a good uni­
verse, I would want it to have life in it. I would want that 
life to include creatures who were free, conscious, beings 
capable of exploring their world. I would want that world to 
be one where courage, sympathy, and self-sacrifice were pos­
sible. I would want the free creatures in that world to have 
real responsibilities, and real adventures. That ours is 
such a world is some reason for me to judge that God is good. 
(I am assuming that my values are the true values. This is 
unobjectionable, since the problem of evil involves making 
the same assumption.) A God who was either indifferent to 
man or actively desiring his suffering would explain some as­
pects of the universe; but it should not be ignored that a
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good God would account for:
Sunsets and symphonies, mothers, music, and the laughter 
of children at play, great books, great art, great sci­
ence, great personalities, victories of goodness over 
evil, the long hard-won ascent from the Stone Age up, 
and all the friendly spirits that are to other souls a 
'cup of strength in some great agony'. . .
If one is convinced that there is a significant prob­
lem of good, then this conviction should reduce one's diffi­
culty in having faith in God's goodness. If, on the other 
hand, one remains unconvinced, one might reply as follows: 
"You are impressed with those aspects of the world 
that fit best with God's being good. I am far more impressed 
with those aspects of the world that fit with God's being 
evil. I am so impressed, in fact, that your faith strikes me 
as unreasonable. In any case, your arguments do nothing to 
convince me. Your arguments have controversial premises. I 
do not agree with your views on beauty, or libertarianism, or 
your contention that a world with such goods in it as courage 
would be superior to any world lacking such goods. But even 
if I granted you every single controversial premise, I would 
still not be impressed by the problem of good. What you of­
fer is another one of those 'cumulative cases'. Such argu­
ments depend on what amounts to 'hunches' or 'intuitions' 
about what is probable. There is no problem with that, ex­
cept where people's intuitive senses of what is probable are 
in conflict. When one juror thinks the accumulation of cir­
cumstantial evidence clearly justifies a guilty verdict, and 
the other is convinced that reasonable doubt remains, there
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is not necessarily a way to prove either party wrong. Both 
may understand and agree on all the facts; and if so, their 
disagreement lies beyond argument, in the realm of 'hunches' 
or 'feelings'. We have different hunches, and you cannot 
show that your judgment on this issue is superior to mine."
I would not argue with these points. The objector 
is correct in saying that the premises I offer are contro­
versial, and the case is cumulative in nature. The same 
points can be made about the problem of evil. The argument 
that evil makes faith in God's goodness unreasonable involves 
controversial claims and "hunches" about what is probable 
that not everyone shares. I suspect that these weaknesses 
are easier for the unbeliever to spot in the problem of good 
than they are in the problem of evil. If this is so, then a 
consideration of the problem of good and its weaknesses as 
an argument for God's goodness should aid in the appreciation 
of similar weaknesses in the atheological argument from evil. 
Therefore, a consideration of the problem of good may aid the 
case for faith in God's goodness whether or not one finds it 
convincing.
Conclusion
There is, as I argued in the first chapter, no con­
tradiction in combining belief that there is a good God, and 
belief that there is evil. However, it is plausible to claim 
that the existence of evil makes the existence of a good God 
less probable than it would otherwise be. There is no obvious
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reason why a good God should create a world in which small 
children suffer from crippling arthritis. Sometimes, we can 
offer an ad hoc hypothesis to cover such events. Sometimes, 
we cannot even provide a very plausible W  hoc hypothesis to 
explain God's failure to prevent the numerous evils around 
us.
The question with which this dissertation deals is 
whether, under these circumstances, faith in God's goodness 
is reasonable. In order to defend a positive answer to that 
question, I first discussed William James and his "religious 
hypothesis." The religious hypothesis is that our lives can 
make a lasting contribution to a valued larger whole. Given 
that the religious hypothesis is not overwhelmingly improb­
able, it is reasonable for at least some people to have faith 
in the religious hypothesis.
I next looked at arguments for the existence of God.
I concluded that belief in the existence of God (with 'God' 
defined in value-neutral terms) is reasonable. One who ac­
cepts the existence of God will state the issues involved in 
the religious hypothesis in terms of God's being good. A 
good God would explain how the religious hypothesis could be 
true. On the other hand, an evil God would make it difficult, 
if not impossible, for the religious hypothesis to be true. 
Therefore, for one convinced that God exists, the same issues 
and the same motivations discussed with regard to the reli­
gious hypothesis will surround the question of God's goodness.
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The reasonableness of faith’s answer to this question de­
pends on the same condition made of the religious hypothesis 
as an object of faith: it must not be overwhelmingly im­
probable.
I therefore turned to the question of whether the 
amount of evil in the world made God's existence overwhelm­
ingly improbable. Evils may be divided into two classes: 
moral evil and natural evil. I argued that God's permission 
of moral evil can be given an adequate explanation. There­
fore, the more significant problem of evil is the problem of 
natural evil.
To judge the degree to which natural evil makes God's
being good improbable, we would need to know three things.
We would need to know how the balance of evil in our world 
compares with that in other possible worlds. We would need 
to know what worlds God might have created. We would also 
need to know what sort of world a good God would be obligated 
to create. I argue that there are difficulties with each of 
these requirements, and therefore reasons to doubt the con­
clusive nature of the problem of evil.
In this final chapter, I have argued that the goods
of this world are as relevant as the evil in judging the mor­
al character of a God whose existence is already assumed. A 
cumulative case can be made for God's being good, employing 
the sort of factors sometimes cited in teleological arguments 
for God's existence. Such a case has its problems. These
are mirror-images of difficulties which afflict an attempt to 
get a conclusive argument from evil. One who thinks these 
difficulties are significant will be skeptical about both the 
problem of good and the problem of evil. One who makes light 
of these problems will have to acknowledge that the tension 
of the problem of evil is in some degree reduced by acknowl-
s
edgement of a balancing problem of good.
I conclude that God's being good is not overwhelmingly 
improbable. In arguing from the existence of evil to the non­
existence of a good God, one becomes involved in controversial 
issues. One has to rest a great deal on what amounts to in­
tuition. A particular person may be convinced that if there 
is a God, he cannot be good, but he cannot reasonably insist 
that everyone agree with the hunches, the value-judgments, and 
the metaphysical views that led him to that conclusion.
There is, then, for the version of theism that I have 
discussed in these pages, no pressing, near-intolerable intel­
lectual problem in basing one's life on faith in God's good­
ness. There are some personal difficulties involved in basing 
one's life on faith in God's goodness. One tends to get mad 
at God at times. But that is a problem to discuss with a 
priest, not with a philosopher.
CHAPTER SIX NOTES
^John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1978), p. IT!
^Basil Mitchell and others, "Theology and Falsifi­
cation," in John Hick, Classical and Contemporary Readings 
in the Philosophy of Religion (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : 
Prentice Hall, 1964), pp. 445-446.
F^. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology, 2 vols. 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930), 2: 202.
^Ibid., pp. 91-93.
^Ibid., pp. 89-93.
^Harry Emerson Fosdick quoted in Hick, Evil and the 
God of Love, p. 11.
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